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3 Johnson The Politics of Possibility 
Abstract 
In this paper I address, in a preliminary way, a problem of political theory 
that, while not new, has been brought home with special urgency by recent 
events. The problem is the predicament created by the imperative of coming 
to terms with the subject of political possibility and the concomitant 
difficulty of doing so. The argument of this paper is circuitous. I first argue 
that grappling with the subject of political possibility requires that we 
examine the intimate relation of symbol and strategy in politics. I draw a 
crucial distinction between the ways that the ability to calculate 
probabilities and to entertain possibilities enters into social and political 
interaction. I than identify the mechanisms – attention and imagination – at 
work in the ways symbolic forms govern our ability to envision possibilities. I 
show how political possibility is implicated with power. And I sketch some 
of the constraints and vicissitudes that make the politics of possibility a 
precarious enterprise. I conclude by briefly connecting my preceding 
analysis to the theme of antipolitics. 
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I. 
In this paper I address a problem of political theory that, while not new, has 
been brought home with special urgency by recent events. The problem is 
the predicament created by the imperative of coming to terms with the 
subject of political possibility and the concomitant difficulty of doing so 
(Dunn 1980, 267,260). In the face of this quandary I pursue a basic intuition: 
in order to properly conceptualize political possibility we must recognize 
and analyze the intimate relation of symbol and strategy in politics. In other 
words, in order to better understand the notion of political possibility we 
must properly grasp its cultural dimensions. An example will perhaps lend 
some, at least initial, plausibility to this intuition. 
The example is drawn from an interview, conducted in October 1982, 
with Bogdan Borusewisz, a Solidarity activist and underground leader. Early 
in the interview he harshly criticized the stance adopted by some Solidarity 
leaders during the period leading up to December 1981 when the Polish 
regime imposed marshal law.  
 “There came a point when democratically elected activists lost all 
contact with reality. And reality was more than Solidarity, more than 
radical leaflets, and Radio Free Europe; it was the USSR, the army, 
and the security service, which we already knew in the autumn of 1980 
had drawn up a list of people to be interned (Lopinski, Moskit and 
Wilk, 1990, 8).” 
In other words, Borusewisz was no wild utopian, intent on holding out 
fantastic alternatives. He was aware that political reality and possibility are, 
in crucial ways, distinguished by material considerations.  
In the same interview, however, Borusewisz reflects on the reasons 
why, during the days immediately after the regime imposed martial law, he 
and others thought it imperative to sustain the strike at the Lenin shipyard.  
 “After all we had to defend a symbol; it wasn’t a question of the 
Gdansk shipyard or the Repair Yard or even Gdansk itself but of 
Poland as a whole. If we’d managed to draw out the strike in the 
shipyard it might have been possible to hold back the authorities on all 
fronts. On the other hand, I was certain that if the strike at the 
shipyard collapsed, the fact that a coal mine or steel works was on 
strike wouldn’t have made any difference, because people think in 
terms of symbols and would hang on as long as the shipyard hung on. 
That is why I tried desperately to defend the shipyard (Lopinski, Moskit 
and Wilk 1990, 30–31).” 
As this passage makes clear, Borusewisz and others recognized that, over 
a decade or so, Poles invested the Gdansk shipyard with special 
significance. They had transformed the shipyard into a symbol, one that 
enabled opponents of the regime to sustain an alternative vision of ‘Poland 
as a whole.’1 Consequently, it became a focal point in the strategic struggle 
between the opposition and the regime. Unlike strikes elsewhere, the one at 
the shipyard, according to Borusewisz, symbolized the possibility, however 
fleeting, that Poles might resist marshal law. Ultimately, Solidarity could not 
                         
1 I take Solidarity to be a paradigmatic antipolitical movement (Ost 1990). The shipyard is 
among the central symbols in the “tradition of resistance” that Polish workers first 
constructed and then extended to other portions of society (Laba 1991).  
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sustain the strike at the shipyard. And although other strikes continued, the 
collapse of the strike there rendered the possibility of widespread, overt 
resistance inconceivable. 
This example is intended to suggest how intimately connected symbol and 
strategy are in social and political life, and how they are related in ways that 
directly effect our capacity to envision political possibilities. My aim in this  
paper is to explore, and hopefully clarify, these claims in a preliminary way. 
The remainder of the paper consists of six sections. In sections two 
and three I draw and hopefully make clear a crucial distinction between the 
ways that the ability to calculate probabilities and to entertain possibilities 
enter into social and political interaction. And I argue that the latter capacity 
is governed by the force of prevailing symbolic forms. In section four I 
identify the mechanisms at work in the ways symbolic forms govern our 
ability to envision possibilities. In section five I address the ways that 
political possibility is implicated with power. In section six I sketch some of 
the constraints and vicissitudes that render the politics of possibility a 
difficult and precarious undertaking. In section seven I briefly connect my 
argument to the theme of antipolitics. 
II. 
“What is politically possible depends in part on what men believe” (Dunn 
1980, 260).2 This is no doubt so. But it also is too quick. I put to one side 
for the moment matters of material or physical constraint. In this section I 
argue that the scope of political possibility is, in the most basic, 
theoretically important sense constituted not by beliefs or expectations per 
se, but by the range of things (e.g., actors, events, outcomes) concerning 
which relevant agents can hold beliefs or establish expectations. Here 
again, perhaps an example will help.  
In his Antipolitics, a book largely devoted to envisioning a possible 
post-Yalta political framework, George Konrad reflected on, among other 
things, the prevailing uncoordinated, largely individualistic strategy of 
opposition in Hungary. He explained that: 
 “We Hungarians never created our own KOR or Solidarity, because we 
didn’t really believe that communist power could be reconciled with 
democratic institutions born of society’s aspirations of self- 
determination. We saw what our Polish friends were doing; we wanted 
them to succeed, but doubted that they could (Konrad 1984, 129–30).” 
This is a straightforward estimation of probabilities. Oppositional elements 
in Hungary, according to Konrad, had no difficulty envisioning collective 
political strategies such as those adopted by KOR or Solidarity. They 
simply believed that such strategies held out a very low probability of 
success.  
Consider, by contrast, the emergence of radically unanticipated actors 
onto the political stage.  When I say that such actors are radically 
unanticipated I mean that ex ante their appearance as political actors was 
not just unforeseen but unforeseeable. Here we might include, for instance, 
the way that the British working classes intruded into politics under the 
aegis of Chartism in the late 1830’s. Or, more recently, and perhaps of 
                         
2 Dunn himself is concerned with grounding the notion of political obligation in a general 
conception of what in different times and places is political possible. He does not 
systematically explore the notion of political possibility. 
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greater relevance to the topic of antipolitics, we might we might include the 
way mothers infiltrated Argentine politics in the late 1970’s. In such 
instances the very incongruity of such actors engaging in politics – as 
workers, or as mothers – scrambles established political categories and, 
thereby redefines the realm of possibility.3 In the latter case, for a period of 
time this incongruity prevented the Argentine Junta from recognizing the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo as political actors in any relevant sense. 
Within the political categories to which the junta, like the rest of Argentine 
society, subscribed, “mothers were not perceived as political subjects.” The 
Mothers of the Plaza, as a result, were enshrouded by a “political 
invisibility” that afforded them a strategically crucial, if temporary, advantage 
over the junta.4 This was a matter not of probability but of possibility or, for 
lack of a better word, worldview. During the early months of the Mother’s 
weekly demonstrations in the Plaza de Mayo, the junta literally did not 
understand the political nature of the protests. Such activity transgressed 
the boundaries of their political world. It simply was not possible for mothers 
to engage in politics.5 By the time the junta reconfigured their conception of 
political possibility so that they could recognize the Mothers as political 
actors, and take repressive measures, it was too late. The Mothers of the 
Plaza already had come to symbolize, both domestically and in the 
international arena, the possibility of open resistance to the Argentine 
regime. 
A worldview amounts to a basic understanding of how the world 
operates, of the sorts of entities (actors, events, outcomes) it contains. 
Among the components of a worldview is a more or less systematic “folk 
psychology,” a general conception of persons and a corresponding set of 
expectations about how they typically behave.6 In the present paper I focus 
exclusively on this dimension of political possibility – the types of political 
subject that relevant actors can hold beliefs or develop expectations about. 
III. 
It is important to distinguish, then, between the different ways that the 
calculation of probabilities and the consideration of possibilities inform 
political action.7 And it is important to see how the latter trades upon the 
                         
3 Dorothy Thompson (1984, 11–12) captures the incongruity of workers entering the 
political of early nineteenth century Britain in the following way. “In the 1830’s the good 
self-respecting workman did not mix in politics. ... When HM Inspector of Prisons interviewed 
the men in prison for Chartist activ ities in 1840, he spoke approvingly of the decision some 
had made to ‘give up politics.’ It did not occur to him that former Chartists should become 
Whigs or Tories. Politics in any form was not the business of the working man.” 
4 I draw the quoted phrases from Navarro (1989, 257). 
5 Hence the practice of the junta of referring to the Mothers as the “madwomen” of the 
Plaza. 
6 On this point see generally Geertz (1983, 55–70) and Bruner (1990, 13–14,35,42–
3,47,52). 
7 “There is a fundamental difference between a situation in which a decision maker is 
uncertain about the state of X and a situation in which the decision maker has not given any 
thought to whether X matters or not, between a situation in which a prethought event judged 
of low probability occurs and a situation in which something occurs that has never been 
thought about, between judging an action unlikely to succeed and never thinking about an 
action. The latter situations in each pair are not adequately modeled in terms of low 
probabilities” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 67). 
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intimate relation of symbol and strategy in politics. All of this will perhaps 
emerge more clearly if we examine attempts to depict the world solely in 
terms of the calculation of probabilities.  
Consider, in this respect, the austere, counterfactual world that 
rational choice theorists construct. Samuel Popkin’s The Rational Peasant 
supplies a particularly instructive example. Early on, Popkin proclaims that 
he will advance an exclusively rational choice analysis of Vietnamese 
peasant politics and that, in so doing, he will treat cultural considerations 
as “givens” (Popkin 1979, 82). He aims to explain peasant politics solely in 
terms of the peasants’ self-interest and their estimates of the likelihood that 
those interests can be realized. Toward the end of the book, however, 
Popkin reflects briefly on the decisive role that he attributes to “political 
entrepreneurs” in facilitating collective action among peasants (Popkin 
1979, 259–66). He suggests that the success or failure of these leaders 
depended crucially on their competence and credibility. But, somewhat 
surprisingly, Popkin insists that their credibility derived from “cultural 
bases.” He attributes the variable success of religious and political 
entrepreneurs over time to their differential ability “to utilize cultural themes”, 
to orchestrate “terms and symbols,” that resonated with their potential 
constituents (Popkin, 1979, 260–61). In short, political entrepreneurs 
engender and sustain credibility through symbolic action. They seek to 
coordinate and mobilize relevant constituencies by more or less skillfully 
deploying symbolic forms that have force over them. 
I will return to Popkin shortly. But now consider a second theoretical 
example, one much closer to the “core” of the rational choice research 
tradition. Here I have in mind the ways that, like Popkin, non-cooperative 
game theorists tacitly incorporate symbolic considerations into their 
purportedly purely strategic models. For present purposes I will consider 
only one of the ways they do so.8 
Game theorists tacitly incorporate symbolic force into their standard 
procedure for transforming games of incomplete information into equivalent 
but technically more tractable games of complete but imperfect information. 
This procedure is complex.9 Simply put, it reduces, for analytical purposes, 
all forms of uncertainty to mutual uncertainty about the payoff functions 
characteristic of players in the game. All players in the game then construct 
conditional probabilities over the “types” of other player that they might 
encounter based on an initial objective distribution that game theorists 
typically attribute to “nature.”  
Symbol and strategy intersect here because, as game theorists 
typically do not recognize, “types” are not natural categories.  
 “The everyday world in which members of any community move, their 
taken for granted field of social action, is populated not by anybodies, 
faceless men without qualities, but by somebodies, concrete classes 
of determinant persons positively characterized and appropriately 
labeled. And the symbol systems which define these classes are not 
given in the nature of things – they are historically constructed, 
socially maintained and individually applied (Geertz 1973, 363–64).” 
                         
8 A more obvious example is the way that Schelling (1960) invokes the “symbolic contents 
of the game” in order to explain how problems of multiple equilibria are resolved in strategic 
settings. This remains the standard resolution to this endemic problem even among more 
highly technical game theorists (Kreps 1990, 101; Myerson 1992). 
9 For a survey see Myerson (1985, 231–42).  
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The range of possible “types” in any population is marked and interpreted 
symbolically. Thus, for example, recalling the revolutionary events of Paris 
in 1848, Tocqueville reports repeated encounters with “workers,” whom he 
readily identifies by their “blouses, which, as we all know, are their fighting 
as well as their working clothes” (Tocqueville 1987, 142 stress added).10 
Here clothing operates as a symbolic marker, allowing Tocqueville to 
recognize the types of actors he encounters and, thereby, to navigate 
perilous, highly indeterminant political circumstances. 
Return now to Popkin. On his account, the political entrepreneurs who 
sought to coordinate the collective action among the Vietnamese peasantry 
encountered the daunting prior problem of projecting comprehensible, 
credible “visions of the future” (Popkin 1988, 61–62; 1979, 261). This 
required that they recast a political world populated by “rational peasants” 
into one in which other “types” – specifically credible, committed 
entrepreneurs – were genuinely possible. And it required articulating this 
possibility in “terms and symbols” that had force for relevant constituencies. 
Popkin argues that Communist organizers did not enjoy success 
comparable to that of religious leaders until they learned to articulate their 
vision of the future in indigenous cultural idioms. Prior to that point 
“[p]easants did not understand why organizers were offering to help them 
and were reluctant to join with them for even small local projects” (Popkin 
1988, 62 stress added; 1979, 261). Their world was symbolically 
constituted in such a way that it could not accommodate the entrepreneurs’ 
“type” as a genuine possibility. It thereby foreclosed the very possibility of 
cooperative collective action. 
IV. 
Consider the following remark that Jürgen Habermas once made in the 
course of a discussion of utopia. 
 “In specific historical moments, where we can recognize a real social 
movement, real historical struggles, we also become aware that 
people do not fight for abstractions – despite the three great and 
ineradicable goals of the French Revolution. People do not fight for 
abstractions, but with images. Banners, symbols, rhetorical speech, 
allegorical speech, utopia-inspired speech, in which concrete goals are 
conjured up before people’s eyes, are indeed necessary constituents 
of movements which have any effect on history at all (Habermas, 1986, 
145–6).” 
                         
10 For further references to the “blouses” of workers, see Tocqueville (1987, 117,130,145). 
Tocqueville also intimates that workers were adept at interpreting the attire of other classes. 
For instance, during the June days he and Corcelle, a fellow delegate to the National Assembly, 
undertook something of a reconnaissance mission through the streets of Paris. He relates one 
of Corcelle’s adventures in the following terms. “He told me afterwards that, having first 
passed several half-constructed barricades without obstruction, he was halted at the last one; 
the workers building it, seeing a fine gentleman in a black suit with clean white linen quietly 
walking around the dirty streets by the Hotel de Ville and stopping in front of them with a 
placid air of curiosity, decided to make some use of this suspicious onlooker. They asked him 
in the name of fraternity to help them in their work. Corcelle ... in the circumstances ... 
rightly thought it best to yield without a fuss. So there he was levering up the pavement and 
putting the stones on top of one another as tidily as he could. His natural clumsiness and his 
wandering thoughts luckily came to his aid, and he was soon dismissed as a useless laborer” 
(Tocqueville 1987, 139 stress added). 
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I agree. In fact, I would suggest that this remark is relevant not just to 
remarkable episodes, but, to political action and interaction more generally. 
Habermas, nonetheless leaves open at least two especially pressing 
sets of theoretical questions. First, if as Bogdan Borusewisz noted in my 
initial example, ‘people think in terms of symbols,’ how are we to 
understand this process. In other words, why do political actors, whether 
individual or collective, indeed fight “with” symbols? What sort of force do 
symbols have that make them effective resources in political struggle? And, 
second, how are we to understand the dynamics of such symbolic 
contests? How do we specify the character of symbolic action? I address 
the first set of question in this section and the second set in the next 
section. 
Cultures consist of intersubjectively shared symbols which actors 
invest with meaning and deploy in ritual, tradition and other cultural 
performances. It is a sort of “symbolic strategy for encompassing 
situations,” for imposing conceptual order on otherwise indeterminant 
processes of interaction (Geertz 1973, 250,230,89; Ortner 1984, 129).11  
On this view: “Symbols instigate social action” (Turner 1974, 55). However, 
they do so, as I now argue, only indirectly. To see why, it is necessary to 
understand how symbols work. This, in turn, requires that we distinguish for 
analytical purposes the “scope” of symbolic forms from their “force.” 
The scope of a symbol or cultural performance refers to “the range of 
social contexts within which” relevant actors regard it “as having more or 
less direct relevance.” Its force refers to its “centrality or marginality” in the 
lives of relevant actors, to the “psychological grip” it exercises over them 
(Geertz, 1968, 111–113). The efficacy of a set of symbolic forms clearly 
depends on the scope that actors attribute to it. This accounts for the 
propensity of oppositional social and political movements, for example, to 
generate elaborate, encompassing “alternative cultures.”12 Yet force takes 
analytical priority over scope. Any claim regarding the scope of a particular 
symbol or practice presupposes that it has force. Absent such force it 
wouldn’t be relevant to any social context.  
The force of symbolic forms is at bottom cognitive or conceptual 
(Lukes 1977, 68f). Symbolic forms, orchestrated in cultural performances of 
various sorts, “structure the way people think  about social life” (Moore and 
Myerhoff 1977, 4).13 They serve as “extrinsic sources of information” 
(Geertz 1973, 92) not in the sense that they convey detailed messages, but 
in a broader sense of imparting a view of how the world actually is – how it 
operates and how individuals can be expected to act within it. Symbolic 
                         
11 On this view, culture consists of “a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic 
forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about 
and attitudes toward life.” And a symbol is “any object, act, event, quality, or relation which 
serves as a vehicle for a conception – the conception being the symbol’s ‘meaning’” (Geertz 
1973, 89,91,10). On the career of this concept of culture see Ortner (1984) and Barth (1989). 
12 This was true, for example, of British Chartists in the 1830’s and 1840’s, of American 
populism in the 1890’s, of the turn of the century German labor movement, and of Italian 
Communists in the 1970’s.  
13 This obviously presumes something about the way we think. But it does not entail 
psychological reductionism. Rather, it presumes an “extrinsic theory” of mind in which diverse 
human mental functions – cognition, emotions, dispositions, etc. – all essentially depend upon 
the availability of sets of symbolic forms (Geertz 1973, 215,45–6,76f,360f). Thus, as 
psychologist Jerome Bruner (1986, 15) contends, “a cultural tool kit – a set of prosthetic 
devices, so to speak” is essential to the full flourishing of “human mental activity.” See also 
Wittgenstin (1967, para. 605–7). 
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forms, then, do not directly instill beliefs or values. Rather, they establish 
the focal categories of social and political interaction and, thereby, establish 
parameters on belief formation. Symbolic forms help delineate – in at least 
two empirically intertwined but analytically distinguishable ways – the realm 
of social and political possibility for relevant actors. 
In the first place, symbolic forms operate indicatively to focus the 
attention of actors, directing it toward certain ranges of alternatives and 
away from others.14 They assert order, relation and predictability in the face 
of indeterminacy (Moore and Myerhoff, 1977, 18). They foreclose 
possibilities. This process is not naive. Symbolic force discriminates. By 
calling attention to certain options, thereby defining them as viable or 
feasible, it forecloses other options. It constitutes social and political 
interactions on particular, partial terms (Lukes 1977, 68–9; Elkins and 
Simeon 1979, 128; Kertzer 1988, 87). 
If symbolic forms only operated indicatively they would have an 
unvaryingly constraining, conservative impact on social and political 
interaction. But symbols also operate subjunctively to disclose possibilities 
often not immediately discernable in mundane existence. They thus open 
options that might go otherwise unconsidered (Bruner 1986, 26,159; Turner 
1987, 26–7,41–42,101). Orchestrated in cultural performances such as 
ritual, for example, symbolic forms give palpable existence to as yet 
unrealized possibility.15 They nourish the imagination of social and political 
actors, helping to “render the world less fixed, less banal, more susceptible 
to recreation” (Bruner, 1986, 159). Thus, this process is not naive either. By 
imaginatively disclosing and exploring possibilities actors can, within limits, 
redefine their options. 
Symbolic forms, then, exert force over social and political actors by 
commanding their attention and capturing their imagination. They govern the 
mental capacities with which actors delimit the possibilities embodied in 
their extant situation and envision those that lie beyond it. So understood, 
the force of symbolic forms grounds the intimate relation between symbol 
and strategy in politics. 
V. 
Symbolic forms govern prevailing conceptions of possibility. They are, in 
Charles Taylor (1985) terms, “constitutive” of practices and institutions. 
This, however, leaves us on an ambiguous theoretical terrain. On the one 
hand, possibility is not defined purely by structural causes.16 The notion of 
political possibility, in particular, presumes that actors intentionally and 
deliberately endeavor to constitute the world in particular ways (Elster 1978, 
48–49). On the other hand, constituting or reconstituting the social and 
political world, disclosing or foreclosing possibilities, does not involve 
selecting or rejecting discrete, pre-defined alternatives. It is not, strictly 
                         
14 Stinchcombe suggests that attention is “the key link between individuals and cultural 
systems.” The force of symbolic forms on his view resides in part in their capacity to establish 
“attention structures” that provide common foci of choice and interaction (Stinchcombe 
1968, 247,235–36). Thus, as Elkins and Simeon (1979, 142,127–28,131,139) put the point: 
“Culture is unlikely to be of much help in explaining why alternative A was chosen over 
alternative B – but it may be of great help in understanding why A and B were considered, 
while no thought was given to C, D, or E.”  
15 “In ritual,” for example, “the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the 
agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turn out to be the same world” (Geertz, 1973, 112). 
16 Even if it obviously is subject to physical and material constraints (Follesdal 1981). 
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speaking, a matter of choice (Follesdal 1981, 402). Rather, it is a matter of 
the ways political actors seek, for strategic purposes, to exploit the force 
that symbolic forms hold for relevant constituencies. How are we to 
understand the character of such symbolic action? 
In the first place, symbolic action consists largely in the efforts to 
invest a symbolic form or cultural performance with particular, partial 
meaning. Relevant constituencies share symbols and the cultural 
performances in which they are orchestrated insofar as they mutually 
attribute significance to that set. However, the meanings that individuals or 
groups within the population attribute to the symbolic components of their 
culture need not be shared. Symbolic forms, not the imperfectly shared, 
occasionally idiosyncratic, frequently contested meanings attributed to 
them, constitute the crucial intersubjective, public dimension of culture. 
Meanings can be shared, more or less imperfectly, within a population 
or they can verge on the idiosyncratic. Indeed political acumen is properly 
conceived less as the capacity to invent new symbols than as the ability to 
creatively recast meanings invested in existing symbolic forms (Walzer 
1967, 196). Anyone attempting such semantic improvisation necessarily will 
challenge the established meanings attributed to a symbol. And they quite 
possibly will confront discordant improvisations crafted by others. Symbolic 
forms do not simply express meaning. They enable social and political 
actors to make, remake and, in the process, contest meanings (Cohen 
1985, 15).17 
Second, as should now be clear, symbolic action is conflictual. Tocqueville 
brings this point home with especial force in one well known episode that he 
recounts in his Recollections. There he recalls as follows the opening in 
early May 1848 of the new Constituent Assembly to which he was an 
elected delegate. 
 “I should be able to call to mind the look of that Assembly at its 
opening, but I find that my recollection is very blurred. . . . I can 
remember only our shouting “Long Live the Republic!” fifteen times in 
the course of the session in competition with one another. . . . I think 
that cry was sincere on both sides, but it stood for different, even 
contradictory thoughts. Everybody wanted to preserve the Republic, 
but some wanted to use it for attack, and others to defend themselves 
(Tocqueville, 1987, p. 99).” 
Tocqueville was not a disinterested observer of this scene. Despite his 
partisanship he grants that the political factions contesting the meaning of 
‘the Republic’ were sincere.18 Delegates of the contending parties were not 
duplicitous; they actually interpreted ‘the Republic’ and the possibilities 
embodied in the political world in different, conflicting ways. 
                         
17 This line of argument has a contentious implication. It suggests that we shift theoretical 
attention away from a Durkheimian inspired preoccupation with culture as a medium of 
integration and instead think of symbolic forms as devices for aggregating meanings (Cohen, 
1985, 20,21). Cultural symbols do not express value consensus or shared belief (Laitin 1988). 
Indeed, symbolic forms do not so much represent or express pre-existing values and beliefs as 
constitute the context within which individuals formulate beliefs and values. They help 
structure belief (Cohen 1979, 98; Kertzer 1988, 68). 
18 On republican symbolism during this period in France see Agulhon (1981). 
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Contests of this sort are essentially strategic, part of what Geertz 
(1973, 316) calls “the struggle for the real.”19 Actors engaged in such 
strategic contests seek, with differential facility and success, to exploit 
symbolic force in order to define the context of their ongoing interactions. 
Their objective is to establish as authoritative a particular and partial 
conception of the world and the social and political possibilities it contains. 
In the struggle for the real actors strive to command the attention and 
capture the imagination of relevant others by directing the symbolic media 
with which they think. 
Third, the struggle for the real is pervasive and inescapable. It takes 
place across a range of arenas. For example, delegates who Tocqueville 
describes mounted their struggle at center stage, publicly contesting the 
range of possibilities contained in ‘the Republic’. By contrast, peasants 
engaging in everyday forms of resistance are effective precisely because 
they do not assail the public stage. They “typically avoid any direct 
symbolic confrontation with authority.” At a more mundane, local level, 
however, they too are engaged in a contest of interpretations, “a struggle 
over the appropriation of symbols . . . over how the past and present should 
be understood and labeled” (Scott 1985, xvi, xvii, 27, 178).  
The struggle for the real is inescapable, it is not a contingent aspect of 
symbolic action. Actors have both the occasion and an incentive to take 
part. Cultures afford ample opportunity for symbolic contests. Because they 
are, by definition, multivocal, symbolic forms obviously invite discordant 
interpretation. Moreover, “cultural systems” are not seamless.20  The 
interstices that they inevitably contain provide openings for semantic 
improvisation. Symbolic forms also establish a powerful incentive to engage 
in the struggle for the real. They do not influence thought or action 
deterministically by directly instilling individual values, beliefs or 
preferences.21 Symbolic force does however circumscribe the range of 
possibilities over which actors might establish values, preferences, or 
beliefs. Moreover, symbolic force discriminates. It can focus attention on 
certain options thereby diverting attention from others and circumscribing 
possibility. It also can slacken the constraints of attention by sustaining 
unrealized options in imagination. In this way it can hold out as viable or 
feasible options that otherwise would not enter into consideration. In these 
ways symbolic force sustains particular conceptions of political possibility 
at the expense of others.22  
The struggle for the real occupies the nexus of symbol and strategy. 
What is at stake in this struggle are political possibilities and the symbolic 
forms that govern how actors entertain them. The struggle for the real, then, 
                         
19 When speaking of symbolic action anthropologists regularly use metaphors of 
“management”, “strategy”, “bargaining” and “negotiation.” For examples and discussion see 
Johnson (1991). Metaphors are not merely literary embellishments. They structure social and 
political inquiry. The metaphors that interpretive theorists deploy provide warrant for 
pursuing the unexamined strategic dimensions of “symbolic action.” 
20 The extent of their internal coherence and interconnectedness is an empirical question 
(Geertz, 1973, 18,406–407; Turner 1974, 163). It is very important not to prejudge the 
extent of this internal coherence (Barth 1989). 
21 Implicitly I am taking sides in a recent theoretical debate concerning cultural explanation. 
Symbolic force operates in the first instance to establish the focal categories of political 
interaction (Laitin 1988; Myerson, 1992) rather than to define values or preferences 
(Wildavsky 1987;1988;1992). 
22 Walzer (1967, 195–96); Lukes (1977, 68); Elkins and Simeon (1979, 128); Kertzer (1988, 
87). 
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is a struggle  over power. In seeing how this is so, we can also identify 
some of the vicissitudes and constraints to which participants in this 
struggle are subject.  
VI. 
The struggle for the real is a struggle over possibility. It is a struggle for 
power. More precisely, it is a struggle for power over others, a contest to 
control the media, the symbols and cultural performances, in terms of which 
social and political actors conceive possibilities and fashion them into viable 
alternatives. The intimate relation of symbol and strategy in politics pivots 
around possibility, feasibility and power. 
Recall that the notion of political possibility presupposes that agents 
intentionally and deliberately seek to constitute the world in particular ways. 
Intentional action is the product of “two successive filtering devices” (Elster, 
1979, 113, 77). The first filter specifies the “feasible set” by circumscribing 
the range of abstractly possible alternatives. The feasible set, then, 
consists of those options genuinely available to actors. The second filter is 
the process through which actors choose from among the options in the 
feasible set.  
Strategic actors regularly contest the context of their interactions – 
including the prevailing set of feasible options that it makes available 
(Schelling 1960). Moreover, what often is at stake in such contests are the 
symbolic media through which others envision possibilities and identify 
some subset of conceivable options as feasible. 
 “After all, options are not just opened or closed. They are essentially 
seen to be open or closed, and crucially seen so under particular 
descriptions, descriptions that can themselves motivate or inhibit 
action. . . . What one cannot envisage is difficult to choose (Rorty, 
1988, 337–38).” 
In any situation the “feasible” as distinct from “merely conceivable” options 
are a function of what actors consider “obvious,” what they “take for granted” 
and there is no general criterion for differentiating genuinely feasible from 
abstractly possible options (Schwartz 1986, 224–228). The way this 
distinction is drawn in particular settings is a question of power.  
Power is a relational concept. When agents exercise power they 
necessarily exercise it over others. In particular, they aim to define the set 
of feasible options that others consider when determining how to act.23 
Thus, power differs from persuasion which aims to modify how others 
evaluate alternatives. It does not directly alter another’s preferences or 
beliefs regarding available options. Similarly, power differs from force which 
aims to eliminate choice on the part of those subjected to it by physically 
narrowing their feasible set to a single option. Power need not involve 
physical constraint. It aims to influence the way others to choose a 
particular course of action by modifying the alternatives available to them. 
Power can work by altering the incentive structure that actors face. It 
consists, in such instances, of negative or positive inducements, threats or 
offers. But power need not involve such inducements at all. Indeed, actors 
can exercise power in strategic situations simply by credibly leading others 
to expect that they will choose a particular course of action (Taylor 1982, 
                         
23 The discussion in this paragraph is indebted to the typology presented by Taylor (1982, 
10–25). 
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12–13,145). Actors who can successfully coordinate the expectations of a 
relevant constituency often can generate the sort of collective action needed 
to sustain selective inducements in the first place (Hardin 1990, 363,366–
69). 
Coordination, however, is typically as much a matter of expectations 
as incentives. Strategic actors can mutually coordinate their expectations 
only by focusing attention on one among a range of alternatives. They must 
create a “focal point” by endowing that option with prominence and this, in 
any given instance, typically is a product of “imagination” (Schelling 1960, 
58). Strategic actors create focal points through symbolic action. They 
invest seemingly extra-strategic particularities with significance, thereby 
transforming them into symbols whose force coordinates social and political 
interaction.24 They exercise power over others by symbolically structuring 
their expectations. Power in this sense, operates “along the cognitive 
dimension” (Lukes 1977, 68; Turner 1974, 134).  
Power may be malign. “It might be said that the main function of a 
system of domination is” to foreclose options, “to define what is realistic 
and what is not realistic and to drive certain goals and aspirations into the 
realm of the impossible, the realm of idle dreams, of wishful thinking” (Scott 
1985, 326). Symbolically constituted attention structures can be highly 
inhibiting. They foreclose possibilities By defining alternatives to existing 
arrangements as infeasible such attention structures can prevent 
subordinate actors from recognizing, much less pursuing a range of 
possibilities. On the other hand, even oppositional groups need to 
circumscribe possibilities.25 They rely on attention structures to coordinate 
their activities and potentially to divert more powerful groups. This is 
precisely the strategy that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, for example, 
adopted when they both occupied the symbolic center of Argentine politics 
(the Plaza from which they took their name) and did so as mothers. 
Disclosing possibilities is a similarly equivocal process. Contesting the 
bounds of political possibility crucially presumes that actors can imagine 
alternatives precluded by extant definitions of the political world. 
Subordinate actors are adept at this sort of symbolic action. In particular, 
they demonstrate a remarkable propensity to symbolically reverse (and 
thereby expose the conventional character of) prevailing social and political 
arrangements (Scott 1985, 331). But if such symbolic action is pervasive, it 
also underscores the observation that “in matters of social constitution the 
field of possibilities is much wider than the people within each society 
imagine” (Tocqueville 1987, 76).26 Symbolic reversals often are little more 
                         
24 In strategic situations not just incentive structures but “the aesthetic properties, the 
historical properties, the legal and moral properties, the cultural properties, and all the other 
suggestive and connotative details, can serve to focus the expectations of certain participants 
on certain solutions” (Schelling 1960, 113). 
25 Circumstances in which “all is possible” are extraordinary. They are fleeting at best. The 
telling characterization of such circumstances as “moments of madness” (Zolberg 1972) 
specifies precisely the sorts of conceptual constraint that prevents participants from 
sustaining them.  
26 This sort of constrained imagination is not characteristic solely of symbolic reversals. “At 
this moment several countries in Eastern Europe . . . have or about to venture into the 
greatest experiment in history since the forced Stalinist industrialization of 1929. . . . the 
economic transformations envisaged in these countries ironically mirror the Communist 
project. . . . They are radical: They are intended to turn upside down all the existing social 
relations. And they offer a single panacea, which once waved will cure all ills. Replace 
‘nationalization of the means of production’ by ‘private property’ and ‘plan’ by ‘market’ and 
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than that. They do not so much project an alternative set of arrangements 
as, by reversing existing relations of dependency, inequity or injustice, 
depict and promote their opposite (Hirschman 1982, 95; Rorty 1988 338). 
Actors who imaginatively explore unrealized possibilities confront 
serious hazards even if they manage to transcend this sort of ubiquitous 
constraint. Most obviously they might intentionally disregard or otherwise 
neglect pragmatic or material constraints (Follesdal 1981). Thinking back to 
the example with which I opened the paper, the symbolic power that 
Solidarity could command was dramatically inadequate in the face of the 
overwhelming military force that the regime mustered. Thus, in the spring of 
1982, one Polish worker lamented: “We’ve got all the symbols, and they’ve 
got all the guns and tanks.”27 Actors who neglect such material constraints 
divert energy and resources into “futile exercises,” flights of fancy that at 
best are compensatory. They encourage fantasy or utopian thinking in the 
pejorative sense (Rorty 1988, 341).28 
Political actors face additional risks even where they pursue “genuine” 
possibilities, alternatives that are viable in the sense of being broadly 
consonant with pragmatic or material constraints. They might simply fail to 
realize possible objectives. As with all intentional action, a gap always 
looms between attempt and accomplishment. Conversely, having realized 
alternative possibilities, relevant actors might encounter a significant gap 
between the reality achieved and the possibility held out. Either eventuality 
can breed disappointment and resignation (Hirschman 1982, 94; Rorty 
1988, 338). Either eventuality, may, in that sense, reinforce the sense of 
inevitability that enshrouds the extant political world. 
VII. 
The argument of this paper has been circuitous. I have argued that grappling 
with the subject of political possibility requires that we examine the intimate 
relation of symbol and strategy in politics. I have drawn a crucial distinction 
between the ways that the ability to calculate probabilities and to entertain 
possibilities enters into social and political interaction. I have identified the 
mechanisms – attention and imagination – at work in the ways symbolic 
forms govern our ability to envision possibilities. I have shown how political 
possibility is implicated with power. And I have sketched some of the 
constraints and vicissitudes that make the politics of possibility a 
precarious enterprise. I now want briefly to connect my preceding argument 
to the theme of antipolitics. I will make three short assertions. 
1. Antipolitics, whether conducted by formally organized collective 
entities like Solidarity or by looser groupings of individuals like the Mothers 
of the Plaza, is implicated in the politics of possibility. Parties to antipolitics 
deploy symbolic forms with greater or lesser facility and success and they 
do so for strategic purposes. They aim to redefine the political world by 
recasting the bounds of political possibility in particular and partial ways. 
                                                                                                                                                   
you can leave the structure of the ideology intact. Perhaps revolutions are shaped by the very 
systems against which they are directed?” (Przeworski 1991, 7). 
27 Reported by Laba (1991, 148). 
28 This discussion minimally requires that we differentiate imagination from fantasy. 
Imagination is concerned with fashioning genuine, viable, if unrealized, alternatives. Fantasy 
inclines toward the “merely possible,” toward options that, while conceivable, remain 
“incredible” and consequently unrealizable (Rorty 1988, 340–41; Wittgenstin 1967, para. 
275).  
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2. Antipolitics, insofar as it is concerned with possibilities, is a strategy in 
the struggle for power. This may seem peculiar given the aversion of 
spokesmen like Konrad to power politics. He claims that the “medium of 
politics is power over people – power backed by weapons” (Konrad 1984, 
16). And he asserts that “No thinking person should want to drive others 
from positions of political power in order to occupy them himself” (Konrad 
1984, 119). Yet since antipolitics of the sort in which Solidarity or the 
Mothers of the Plaza engage entails participation in the “struggle for the 
real”, this suspicion of power is simply misplaced.29 
3. It is easy to find pessimists, those who view the struggle for the real 
and the efforts to redefine political possibility that it entails as inherently 
dangerous. But it is not easy to find alternatives. In politics symbol and 
strategy are related in inescapable ways. So, for example, the invention of 
traditions is a pervasive strategic move in politics.30 But observers of 
politics in post-communist East Central Europe typically express suspicion 
of political actors who invoke tradition (Gyani 1993; Jaworski 1985). They 
rarely consider whether, in such highly indeterminant political 
circumstances, it might be possible to invent normatively appealing 
traditions. I have in mind here, for instance, a tradition of constitutionalism 
(Johnson 1994). We must, as the brochure for this conference suggests, be 
wary of antipolitical mobilizations that threaten to derail the emergence or 
stability of liberal democratic political arrangements. However, the most 
effective response to such mobilizations is to engage in the politics of 
possibility. And this means recognizing the need to effectively exercise the 
power that emerges at the intersection of symbol and strategy. 
                         
29 It may be more appropriate to say that Konrad really is opposed to force as a final 
guarantor of political arrangements. But we should not let his invocation of “spiritual 
authority” or “moral opposition” (Konrad 1984, 119,122) blind us to the fact that 
antipolitics is part of the “struggle for the real” and hence is a struggle for power. Both 
Solidarity and the Mothers of the Plaza invoked spiritual authority in the face of authoritarian 
rule. But they did so in hopes of expanding the range of political possibilities beyond those 
sanctioned by extant political arrangements.  
30 Compare Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) and Schelling (1960). 
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